

Democratic regime support in Taiwan and South Korea: a latent class approach

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ABSTRACT

Why do some states sustain democratic governance while others fail? Research points to citizens' attitudes, yet measuring support is difficult, especially in Asia, where endorsement of democracy coexists with acceptance of authoritarian practices. Chu and Huang (2010) propose a framework classifying citizens into four clusters based on democratic legitimacy and liberal values using Asia Barometer Survey data. This study argues that economic change, digital media expansion, and generational shifts have fragmented political attitudes in postmodern societies like Taiwan and South Korea, fostering "modular" identities with cross-cutting views. Using Latent Class Analysis (LCA), it uncovers hidden groupings and shows LCA captures nuances missed by conventional typologies, offering a more flexible tool for assessing democratic support and resilience.

DEMOCRATIC REGIME SUPPORT IN TAIWAN AND SOUTH KOREA: A LATENT CLASS APPROACH

Why do some states sustain democratic governance while others fail? Research points to citizens' attitudes, yet measuring support is difficult, especially in Asia, where endorsement of democracy coexists with acceptance of authoritarian practices. Chu and Huang (2010) propose a framework classifying citizens into four clusters based on democratic legitimacy and liberal values using Asia Barometer Survey data. This study argues that economic change, digital media expansion, and generational shifts have fragmented political attitudes in postmodern societies like Taiwan and South Korea, fostering "modular" identities with cross-cutting views. Using Latent Class Analysis (LCA), it uncovers hidden groupings and shows LCA captures nuances missed by conventional typologies, offering a more flexible tool for assessing democratic support and resilience.

Introduction

Why do some states sustain democratic governance while others fail? One influential explanation shifts attention beyond formal institutions to the role of citizens themselves. Studies in the field assert that democratic consolidation is not solely about institutional arrangements but also about the attitudes and behaviors of citizens (Bratton & Mattes, 2001; Norris, 2011; Welzel, 2013). In this context, measuring public support becomes critical for understanding the health and future of democratic regimes. Measuring public support for democracy, however, is a complex and contested endeavor. It requires distinguishing between superficial endorsement and deeper normative commitment, between cognitive understanding and affective attachment, and between support for democracy in principle versus satisfaction with its performance in practice (Huhe & Tang, 2017; Welzel & Alvarez, 2014). In Asia, this distinction is particularly critical because citizens frequently endorse democracy in principle while simultaneously legitimizing authoritarian practices. Geopolitical rivalries, religious authority, and Confucian values

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emphasizing collectivism, hierarchy, and meritocracy further complicate efforts to gauge the extent of popular support for democracy (Hsieh, 2025; Shin 2020; Lin, 2021).

To address this complexity, Chu and Huang (2010) proposed a four-group typology of democratic support based on measure of democratic legitimacy and liberal-democratic values. The framework was originally designed for cross-national comparison using pooled data from the Asia Barometer Survey—an ongoing study since 2001 that tracks democratic developments across Asian societies. Within this context, classifying individual levels of democratic support became a common instrument for assessing democratic conditions and anticipating potential trajectories (Ariely, 2015; Chang, 2016; Hsieh & Yu, 2020; McAllister & Biddle, 2024; Sanborn, 2015).

Since the introduction of Chu and Huang's four-group typology, however, the focus of research has shifted. Earlier studies aimed to explain the factors behind contradictory patterns of democratic support in transitional Asian societies. More recently, attention has moved toward increasingly complex socio-political dynamics, calling for more context-sensitive and case-specific methodological approaches (Gidron & Hall, 2017; Hobolt, 2016; Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Lee & Kwon, 2019).

More specifically, rapid economic restructuring, the proliferation of digital media ecosystems, and generational shifts have transformed many Asian societies, diversifying the political landscape and producing increasingly fragmented and cross-cutting forms of public opinion. South Korea and Taiwan are compelling cases of complex societies that increasingly exhibit postmodern characteristics, including fragmented identities, media-saturated political discourse, and the erosion of stable ideological alignments (Han, 2026; Kim, 2025). These developments expose the limitations of conventional frameworks such as cleavage theory and linear modernization models, which presuppose coherent, durable, and structurally anchored political orientations. In South Korea, digitally amplified generational and gender-based conflicts produce forms of affective polarization that are

often decoupled from consistent ideological commitments (Hur, 2026). In Taiwan, layered and situational national identities generate fluid positions on sovereignty and governance that shift across contexts rather than aligning with fixed partisan or ideological blocs (Tsai & Tsai, 2024). Such patterns suggest the emergence of what may be termed modular political identities, in which individuals assemble issue-specific positions from diverse and sometimes contradictory value repertoires. This shift challenges static typological classification and instead calls for analytical approaches that capture the multi-dimensional, networked, and temporally dynamic nature of political attitudes in postmodern societies.

This study thus revisits the widely applied framework originally proposed by Chu and Huang (2010) using latent class analysis (LCA), a data-driven approach that allows attitudinal groupings to emerge from observed response patterns. Rather than replacing existing typologies or proposing a universally applicable alternative classification, the study demonstrates how LCA can refine measurement within a specific context by uncovering patterns that are not captured by conventional deductive approaches.

Using the cases of Taiwan and South Korea, two postmodern societies, the study shows that the complexity of modern societies requires models beyond the static 4-class typology. In this context, it demonstrates that latent class analysis can serve as a valuable tool in attempts to assess democratic resilience and potential future trajectories.

Measuring Democratic Support and Latent Class Analysis

In their attempt to design an effective tool to classify individual democratic support across Asian societies, Chu and Huang (2010) utilized two constructs: legitimacy and liberal-democratic values. The former measures support in terms of preference, desire, suitability, efficacy, and priority. The latter construct assesses the value orientation in terms of political equality, popular accountability, political liberalism, pluralism and separation of power .

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To classify respondents, factor scores for the two constructs are estimated and by using a cut-off point (grand mean or median) for each of the two constructs, individuals are assigned to four distinct types of democratic support. More specifically, those individuals with high levels of legitimacy and liberal-democratic values are labelled *consistent democrats*. They form the normative liberal democrats and are followed by the critical democrats, who support liberal-democratic values but remain skeptical of institutional efficacy or legitimacy. The *superficial democrats* are next in this hierarchical structure of democratic support. They score high on democratic legitimacy but exhibit low support for liberal-democratic values. At the very end of this dichotomized scale are the *non-democrats*. Because of its straightforward structure, the framework has been influential and proved particularly valuable in cross-country analyses of Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) data (Kang, 2016; MacAllister & Biddle, 2024; Sanborn, 2015).

As the method assigns respondents to pre-labelled groups, it performs best in cross-country studies that include balanced representation across regime types—from authoritarian systems to fully established democracies. In other situations, especially in single-country studies, it produces less reliable results. Amid the ongoing democratic backsliding in Asia, for example, the cut-off points have shifted downward, producing a disproportionate share of *consistent democrats*. In other words, while the method continues to sort respondents into four groups reflecting varying levels of democratic support, the characteristics of most groups differ substantially from those in the original typology. Moreover, the approach incorporates a diverse set of indicators, but individual cases are ultimately classified using thresholds based on two aggregated constructs, constraining abilities to identify latent clusters beyond the predefined categories. In situations where researchers aim to move beyond broad population trends to uncover minority or niche profiles and examine the underlying traits of each cluster, inductive approaches—such as latent class analysis—are more suitable.

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Latent class analysis (LCA) adopts a probabilistic, model-based clustering technique that simultaneously examines the relationships among all observed variables. Instead of imposing arbitrary cut-offs, LCA estimates the probability that each respondent belongs to a given class based on their response patterns (Hagenaars & McCutcheon, 2002; McCutcheon, 1987). This allows individuals to be assigned to classes in a way that reflects their latent attitudinal orientation rather than a predetermined categorization scheme. Moreover, LCA generates statistical criteria such as the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to ensure that the number of groups is empirically validated rather than theoretically imposed (Nylund et al., 2007).

Methodology

Data and Measurement

The analysis uses data from Wave 6 of the Asian Barometer Survey for Taiwan. Three measures are included in the latent class model: (1) democratic legitimacy, capturing preferences for democratic governance and its perceived suitability and efficacy (Supplementary Appendix A); (2) detachment from authoritarianism, measuring rejection of non-democratic alternatives (Supplementary Appendix B); and (3) liberal-democratic value orientations, including attitudes toward equality, hierarchy, pluralism, and social conformity (Supplementary Appendix C).

The measure of *detachment from authoritarianism* was not part of the original model developed by Chu and Huang (2010). Drawing on studies on emerging forms of authoritarianism across various Asian contexts and because it has been applied in previous studies (Chang et al, 2006), the measure was incorporated in the analysis to identify individuals characterized by distinct preferences for authoritarian rule (Ding & Slater, 2020; Kim, 2025). One item, (desirability of democracy) of the original measure *democratic legitimacy* was excluded from the *Asia Barometer Survey* instrument while three items

regarding equality and religious authority were added to the *liberal-democratic values* battery of the survey (Supplementary Appendix C).

In the regression analyses, covariates were used to control for demographics and the socio-political background of the respondents. Supplementary Appendix E summarizes the descriptive statistics for the covariates used in the regression analysis. *Political activism* explores both the actual and intended engagement of respondents in alternative forms of political participation—such as signing petitions or joining citizen groups that advocate for specific social or political causes (Supplementary Appendix D). These more assertive forms of participation are usually associated with higher individual support for democracy (Dalton, 2008; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Norris, 2011; Welzel, Inglehart & Klingemann, 2003). The scale yields a Cronbach's α of 0.80 and was calculated by averaging the scores of its constituent items (Warmbrod, 2014).

Analysis

In this study, latent class analysis was conducted to identify distinct patterns of individual support for democracy. The analysis was performed using *MPlus* 8.1. Unconstrained models were used to allow parameters (item probabilities/thresholds) to vary freely across classes, capturing maximum heterogeneity. Parameters were estimated using maximum likelihood with robust standard errors (MLR). Multiple random starts were applied to avoid local maxima and ensure the best solution is found. The model incorporated sampling weights and handled missing data using full-information maximum likelihood (FIML), allowing all available item responses to be used without resorting to listwise deletion (Depaoli et al., 2025).

In the first step, the number of classes was selected based on model fit statistics and interpretability (Weller et al, 2020). In the second step of the analysis, respondents were assigned to classes based on the estimated parameters of the latent class model and their posterior class membership probabilities. In the final step, covariates were added to the

model and a multinomial logistic regression carried out to examine correlations with class membership. As to avoid underestimating the relationships between covariates and class membership, the most likely class was regressed on the predictor variables, taking into account the misclassification in the second step (Vermunt, 2010). This step was administered by using the *R3Step* option of *MPlus* (Asparouhov & Muthén, 2014). Multiple imputation (MI) was performed to deal with missing data in the regression utilizing the *Data Imputation* command of *MPlus* (Asparouhov & Muthén, 2025). More specifically, 50 datasets were used in the imputation. Convergence was monitored via *Potential Scale Reduction* ($PSR < 1.05$). As a sensitivity check, we compared the MI results with a complete-case specification. The class profiles and the direction/significance of the multinomial logistic regression coefficients remained substantively identical, confirming the robustness of the primary findings.

Results

Latent class models with between two and ten classes were estimated and compared using multiple model selection criteria to determine the best-fitting solution (Supplementary Appendix F). In general, model fit improves as additional classes are included until an optimal point is reached, after which further increases tend to degrade model quality. The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is widely regarded as the most reliable indicator for identifying the appropriate number of latent classes (Nylund et al., 2007; Vermunt, 2002), with lower values indicating better fit (Vermunt, 2002). In addition to information criteria, the bootstrapped likelihood ratio test (BLRT) was used to assess whether adding more classes significantly improved model fit. Based on the BIC, the seven-class solution provided the best fit. Beyond statistical indicators, interpretability was also evaluated, considering the clarity and distinctiveness of class profiles, the absence of redundant or poorly differentiated classes, and the theoretical and substantive meaningfulness of the solution (Weller et al., 2020). Taken together, these considerations supported the selection

of the seven-class model. Moreover, high entropy (0.85) and average posterior probabilities of the clusters (0.87–0.93) suggest a good separation of classes (Weller et al., 2020).

[Table 1 about here]

Class Membership and Characteristics

Based on the prevalence and item-response probabilities (Table 1), the defining characteristics of each class can be obtained. Class 1 shows the strongest liberal democratic commitment, rejecting all authoritarian and illiberal norms. Class 2 supports democracy but holds more moderate, somewhat conservative views on hierarchy and authority. Class 3 favors democracy and equality but prioritizes majority rule over institutional constraints. Class 4 is conditionally democratic, with mixed views and openness to authoritarianism. Class 5 supports democracy but emphasizes social order and shows lower engagement. Class 6 reflects a coherent authoritarian orientation. Class 7 is the most anti-democratic, strongly favoring authoritarian rule.

Taken together, the seven classes reveal a structured distribution of political attitudes, ranging from strongly liberal democratic to explicitly authoritarian orientations. While a majority of respondents fall into broadly democratic categories (Classes 1–5), these groups differ substantially in their commitment to liberal norms, institutional constraints, and evaluations of democratic performance. A smaller but significant minority (Classes 6 and 7) exhibits clear authoritarian tendencies, highlighting the presence of underlying support for non-democratic governance alternatives. In terms of geographical distribution, the analysis shows that the prevalence of classes differs significantly between the two observed societies (Table 1).

[Table 2 about here]

Multinomial Logistic Regression

To better understand these groups, we examine their socio-demographic and attitudinal profiles. Rather than testing causal hypotheses, the analysis provides a

descriptive characterization of each cluster. Table 2 shows the estimates of the demographic and socio-political predictors of cluster membership. Class 2 was chosen as the reference group as it constitutes the largest cluster among the two most democratic classes.

Education, political engagement, and age emerge as the primary determinants of latent class membership relative to Class 2. Education exerts a consistently negative and statistically significant effect across all comparisons, indicating that more highly educated individuals are disproportionately concentrated in the reference group, while less educated respondents are more likely to be found in all other classes, including both democratic (Classes 3–5) and authoritarian profiles (Classes 6–7). Political activism similarly reduces the likelihood of belonging to most alternative classes—particularly Class 5, Class 4, and both authoritarian groups—suggesting that active political engagement anchors individuals in moderate, system-supportive democratic positions. In contrast, age exhibits a polarizing effect: older respondents are significantly more likely to belong to Class 3, Class 5, and Class 7, indicating a shift away from moderate democratic orientations toward either skepticism or authoritarian preferences. Among contextual variables, rural residence modestly increases the likelihood of belonging to Class 4 and Class 5, while lower levels of secularism significantly predict membership in Class 7, highlighting the role of traditional religious orientations in shaping authoritarian attitudes. Gender and income show no significant effects. Taken together, the results suggest that education and political engagement stabilize moderate democratic support, whereas aging and religiosity contribute to divergence toward less liberal or openly authoritarian orientations.

Discussion

The global resurgence of authoritarianism and democratic backsliding has renewed scholarly interest in the quality and resilience of democratic support among citizens (Shin, 2020). Previous studies have relied on the classic typology proposed by Chu and Huang (2010) to identify broad population trends across Asian societies by measuring and

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classifying democratic support at the individual level. The model comprises four clusters with distinct levels of democratic support. In this article, we argue that public opinion has, however, become more diversified requiring refined methodologies to capture the complexity of contemporary societies, especially in postmodern contexts. In this study, we utilize latent class analysis (LCA) to identify minority niche profiles as well as distinct differences between the various clusters. Based on the fit statistics and interpretability of different class solutions, the seven-class model was selected in this study. We also replicated the procedure of the classic approach by Chu and Huang (2010) using the data of this study for comparison.

[Figure 1 about here]

Figure 1 projects these two distinct classification frameworks onto a shared coordinate plane defined by support for democracy in terms of legitimacy and standardized scores for liberal-democratic values. The figure shows a more nuanced picture of democratic support in the two postmodern societies of Taiwan and South Korea. The clusters B1–B4 represent the deductive typology (Chu & Huang, 2010) based on quadrant-split logic (grand mean cut-offs), partitioning the sample into four distinct archetypes of democratic support. In contrast, groups CL1–CL7 represent an inductive classification derived from our latent class analysis.

In terms of internal heterogeneity of majority profiles, the results show that the classic method identifies the *consistent democrat* (B4) as the most prevalent type, representing a broad consensus of high support. However, the LCA results suggest that this volume is not monolithic. Instead, it is partitioned into three distinct classes: CL1 ($n = 257$), CL2 ($n = 530$), and CL3 ($n = 572$). This indicates that while a large portion of the population occupies the upper-right quadrant, they do so with varying degrees of emphasis on liberty versus legitimacy—a nuance that the CL-series effectively captures.

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The scatter plot in Figure 1 also illustrates that the varying sizes of the latent classes reveal the existence of *niche* orientations that are otherwise subsumed in broader categories. For example, CL6 ($n = 159$) and CL7 ($n = 236$) are the smallest groups, yet they represent critical theoretical deviations. The fact that these groups remain statistically viable ($n > 100$) despite the 7-class optimization suggests that these are not mere outliers, but robust, specialized segments of the population that the classic cut-off model fails to isolate.

Moreover, the size of B2 ($n = 758$) relative to the CL series indicates that the deductive approach may inflate the prevalence of certain extreme profiles. By assigning every individual to one of four quadrants using a fixed cutoff, the traditional method tends to produce large, concentrated groups. In contrast, latent class analysis (LCA) generates more evenly distributed groupings, suggesting that many individuals cluster near the intersections of these dimensions rather than at the extremes of any single quadrant.

The study also shows that Korea and Taiwan exhibit markedly different distributions of democratic attitudes across the seven latent classes, pointing to distinct configurations of public opinion (Table 1). In Korea, the largest groups are CL3 (27.3%) and CL4 (22.5%), alongside a notable share of the most democratic clusters CL1 (14.5%) and CL2 (16.1%). This pattern suggests a fragmented democratic culture in which support for democracy coexists with ambivalence toward institutional constraints and a relatively strong emphasis on majority rule. In contrast, Taiwan is overwhelmingly characterized by the more conservative cluster CL5 (39.8%) and the second most democratic cluster CL2 (22.5%). This indicates a more consolidated normative commitment to democracy but accompanied by widespread skepticism of its performance and low political affinity (CL5). While the overall size of authoritarian-leaning groups is similar in both countries (approximately 13–15%), their composition differs slightly: Korea has a higher proportion of CL7, the most authoritarian cluster, (9.6%), whereas Taiwan shows a comparatively greater presence of the more moderate CL6 (7.8%). Taken together, these findings suggest that Korea's primary

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challenge lies in attitudinal fragmentation and majoritarian tendencies, whereas Taiwan faces a tension between strong democratic commitment and pervasive skepticism of democratic outcomes and low political affinity.

Although classifying levels of popular democratic support is crucial for understanding democratic conditions, its explanatory value can be enhanced by incorporating socio-demographic covariates into the analytical model. Earlier approaches estimated regression models separately, treating class assignment as the observed dependent variable. However, this method tends to underestimate the relationships between covariates and class membership and may produce biased structural estimates (Bakk and Kuha, 2020). To address this issue, latent class software packages such as *MPlus* and *Latent Gold* have introduced the automated bias-adjusted three-step command, which enables researchers to obtain more accurate estimates of the relationships between covariates and class membership (Asparouhov and Muthén, 2014; Vermunt, 2010). Although a detailed contextual analysis of these results falls outside the scope of this research note, they help illuminate socio-demographic differences among the latent clusters and clarify how these patterns connect to broader studies of democratization and country-specific developments.

Conclusion

This study revisits established approaches to measuring democratic support in Asian contexts by applying latent class analysis (LCA) to Asia Barometer Survey (ABS) survey data from Taiwan and South Korea. The results show that democratic orientations are more diverse and internally differentiated than conventional typologies suggest.

Rather than proposing a new universal classification, the study highlights the value of latent class analysis (LCA) in refining measurement within a specific context. Future research could extend this approach to other cases or explore changes over time to better understand the dynamics of democratic attitudes.

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Table 1

Prevalence and Item-Response Probabilities

Table 2

Multinomial Logistic Regression Estimates: Predictors of Class Membership (Class 2 = Reference)

Figure 1

Fixed Class Model (B1–B4) and Latent Class Model (CL1–CL7) ($n = 2,747$)

Table 1*Geographical Prevalence and Item-Response Probabilities (n = 2,747)*

	Class 1 9%	Class 2 19%	Class 3 21%	Class 4 13%	Class 5 23%	Class 6 6%	Class 7 9%
Support for democracy*							
<i>Suitability of democracy</i>							
- Completely unsuitable	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.06
- Fairly suitable	0.25	0.16	0.14	0.21	0.29	0.33	0.27
- Completely suitable	0.72	0.83	0.85	0.77	0.67	0.65	0.67
<i>Preferability of democracy</i>							
- Democracy is always preferable	0.82	0.76	0.80	0.64	0.53	0.47	0.44
- Depends on circumstances	0.11	0.18	0.10	0.29	0.18	0.27	0.27
- For people like me, it does not matter	0.07	0.06	0.10	0.07	0.29	0.26	0.29
<i>Efficacy of democracy</i>							
- Democracy is capable of solving problems	0.85	0.81	0.85	0.63	0.70	0.64	0.74
Authoritarian Detachment*							
Get rid of parliament/elections and have strong leader	0.05	0.02	0.03	0.27	0.17	0.28	0.86
Only one party be allowed in politics	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.20	0.05	0.17	0.63
The army should govern the country	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.16	0.03	0.07	0.44
Get rid of elections/parliaments and have experts decide	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.16	0.07	0.17	0.66
Authoritarian/liberal values*							
Women should not be involved in politics as much as men	0.08	0.01	0.06	0.08	0.04	0.17	0.47
Religious authorities interpret laws	0.04	0.12	0.13	0.14	0.19	0.33	0.49
Participation regardless of educational background	0.88	0.86	0.76	0.28	0.85	0.94	0.66
Government leaders like head of family and be followed	0.03	0.09	0.45	0.07	0.25	0.56	0.66
Government decides what issues be discussed	0.04	0.06	0.36	0.10	0.22	0.53	0.61
Harmony be disrupted if people organize lots of groups	0.07	0.22	0.37	0.10	0.51	0.79	0.65
Judges accept the view of the executive branch	0.08	0.27	0.47	0.12	0.51	0.75	0.61
Governments checked by legislature cannot achieve much	0.06	0.30	0.35	0.13	0.53	0.85	0.53
Morally upright leaders be allowed to decide everything	0.11	0.05	0.50	0.10	0.20	0.52	0.61
Different ways of thinking cause society to be chaotic	0.06	0.31	0.40	0.13	0.63	0.92	0.66

	Class 1 9%	Class 2 19%	Class 3 21%	Class 4 13%	Class 5 23%	Class 6 6%	Class 7 9%
Geographical Distribution*							
South Korea (<i>n</i> = 1,216)	0.14	0.16	0.27	0.22	0.06	0.04	0.10
Taiwan (<i>n</i> = 1,531)	0.04	0.23	0.14	0.04	0.40	0.08	0.08

Notes: **p* < 0.001

Table 2

Multinomial Logistic Regression Estimates: Predictors of Class Membership (Class 2 = Reference)

	Class 1 9% (n = 257)	Class 3 19% (n = 572)	Class 4 21% (n = 360)	Class 5 13% (n = 633)	Class 6 23% (n = 159)	Class 7 6% (n = 236)
Demographic predictors						
<i>Age</i>	.02 (.08)	-.24*** (.07)	.06 (.07)	.22*** (.07)	-.12 (.09)	.24*** (.09)
<i>Sex (reference group: male)</i>	-.28 (.19)	-.22 (.17)	-.29 (.18)	-.13 (.16)	-.03 (.24)	-.21 (.21)
<i>Education</i>	-.44** (.18)	-.46*** (.16)	-1.48*** (.16)	-.16*** (.15)	-1.01*** (.23)	-1.33*** (.19)
<i>Household income</i>	.01 (.06)	-.08 (.05)	.02 (.12)	-.02 (.05)	-.09 (.07)	-.05 (.07)
<i>Urban-Rural index</i>	-.20** (.10)	-.15 (.10)	-.19** (.09)	.17** (.08)	.05 (.11)	.05 (.11)
Socio-political predictors						
<i>Political activism</i>	-.15 (.16)	-0.35*** (.13)	-.80*** (.18)	-.82*** (.16)	-.71** (.29)	-.58*** (.19)
<i>Secularism</i>	.12 (.14)	-.12 (.13)	.02 (.12)	-.18* (.10)	-.25 (.18)	-.55*** (.18)
<i>Intercept</i>	.84 (.83)	1.80** (.79)	2.10** (.75)	2.73*** (.70)	3.00*** (1.08)	3.52*** (.92)

Notes: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$; $n = 2747$; Nagelkerke Rsq = 0.189; robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.

Class 1: Liberal Democrats; Class 2 = Conservative Democrats; Class 3 = Majoritarian Democrats; Class 4 = Ambivalent Conservatives; Class 5 = Social Democrats,

Class 6 = Authoritarian Statists; Class 7 = Hardline Authoritarians




Figure 1
Fixed Class Model (B1-B4) and Latent Class Model (CL1-CL7) (n = 2,747)

487x247mm (300 x 300 DPI)

APPENDIX A

Table A1*Democratic Legitimacy*

Preferability of democracy	<i>Percent</i>
Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government.	65
Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one.	18
For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a nondemocratic regime.	15
Don't know	2
Suitability of democracy	<i>Mean</i>
Democracy is suitable for our country (from 1 completely unsuitable, to 10 completely suitable).	7.35
Efficacy of democracy	<i>Percent</i>
Democracy is capable of solving the problems of our society.	72
Democracy cannot solve the problems of our society.	24
Don't know	4

N = 2,747

Source: ABS 6

APPENDIX B

Table B1

Authoritarian Detachment

	Percent		
	Agree	Disagree	Don't know
1. We should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things.	18	81	2
2. Only one political party should be allowed to stand for election and hold office.	10	88	2
3. The military should come in to govern the country.	7	93	1
4. We should get rid of elections and parliaments and have experts make decisions on behalf of the people.	12	87	2

N = 2,747

Source: ABS 6

APPENDIX C

Table C1*Authoritarian/democratic Values*

	Percent		
	Agree	Disagree	Don't know
1. Women should not be involved in politics as much as men.	9	90	1
2. The government should consult religious authorities when interpreting the laws.	17	81	2
3. People with little or no education should have as much say in politics as highly-educated people.	70	29	1
4. Government leaders are like the head of a family; we should all follow their decisions.	27	72	1
5. The government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society.	23	75	2
6. Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organize lots of groups.	35	63	2
7. When judges decide important cases, they should accept the view of the executive branch.	37	60	3
8. If the government is constantly checked by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things.	36	62	3
9. If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything.	26	72	2
10. If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic.	41	58	1

N = 2,747

Source: ABS 6

APPENDIX D

Table D1

Political Activism

	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. dev.</i>
1. Signed a paper or online petition	4.28	.87
2. Used the Internet including social media networks to express opinions about politics and government	4.41	.86
3. Joined a group to actively support a cause (including online)	4.55	.70
4. Got together with others face-to-face to try to resolve local problems.	4.43	.68
5. Attended a demonstration or protest march	4.56	.64

N = 2,747

Source: ABS 6

APPENDIX E

Table E1*Covariates Used in Regression Analysis*

Variable name	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Age	48.61	15.89	19	100
Gender (Female = 1)	0.48	0.50	0	1
Education (1 = Less than secondary, 3 = College+)	2.28	0.65	1	3
Household Income (Quintiles)	3.01	1.35	1	5
Urban-Rural Index (1 = Capital, 4 = Village)	2.16	1.03	1	4
Political Activism	0.56	0.56	0	3.8
Secularism (1 = Very religious, 4 = Not religious at all)	2.76	0.77	1	4

APPENDIX F

Table F1

Model Fit Information for Latent Class Analysis (n=2,747)

Number of classes	Log-likelihood	AIC	BIC	ABIC	Entropy	Bootstrap p-value
2	-45720.31	91658.63	92303.72	91957.39	0.85	.00
3	-44492.32	89312.64	90283.24	89762.15	0.85	.00
4	-43750.76	87939.52	89235.62	88539.79	0.85	.00
5	-43054.36	86656.71	88278.31	87407.73	0.86	.00
6	-42681.22	86020.43	87967.54	86922.19	0.85	.00
7*	-42335.34	85438.69	87711.30	86491.21	0.85	.00
8	-42121.93	85121.86	87719.98	86325.13	0.85	.00
9	-41913.89	84815.77	87739.39	86169.79	0.85	.00
10	-41749.52	84597.03	87846.16	86101.81	0.84	.00

Notes: AIC, Akaike information criterion; BIC, Bayesian information criterion; ABIC, sample-size-adjusted BIC.

*Selected as final model.