Chapter 5

Human Security and Post-Conflict Development in Taiwan

Christian Schafferer

Introduction

After World War II, Japan lost sovereignty over Taiwan and the Pescadores. The United States, the principal occupying power, authorized the government of the Republic of China to administer the islands. In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party under Mao Zedong defeated the Chinese nationalists (Kuomintang) and proclaimed the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek subsequently retreated to Taiwan. Over the following decades, both Chinese societies experienced significant socio-economic as well as political changes. In Taiwan, rapid economic growth was followed by a growing demand for political rights and civil liberties, which transformed the island-state not only into an economic miracle but also into one of Asia's most vibrant democracies. This chapter looks at the key factors behind Taiwan's successful post-conflict development, identifies commonalities and differences with other post-conflict developments in the region, and analyzes the current impact of rising China on human security development in Taiwan and East Asia as a whole. The following section of the chapter serves as an introduction to the general setting of Taiwan's post-conflict development and provides a brief analysis of its position with respect to other post-conflict regimes in the region.

In modern history, there have been several changing patterns of conflicts in East Asia. For most of the time, armed conflicts in the region involved only a limited number of warring parties and mostly were single-issue oriented. The nature of armed conflicts between states or between different actors within a state changed considerable after World War II as a result of the global spread of communism and the subsequent Cold War (Kaldor 2007). Classical conflicts primarily served the interest of the warring parties. Under the new bipolar world order, however, conflicts in most parts of the world substituted for direct confrontation between the new superpowers, and these proxy wars were designed to expand their spheres of influence rather than to protect the sovereignty and interests of the warring states. In the second half of the last century, East Asia became the battleground of ideological warfare driven by Western interests and communism. The application of proxy wars fundamentally changed peace and security and had a profound

impact on human development in the region (Betts 1993). Proxy warfare in East Asia (1) left the previous nations of China and Korea divided into two states each depending on either pillar of the new world order, (2) caused serious devastation and human suffering in Vietnam, (3) triggered a civil war in Cambodia that led to the Khmer Rouge reign of terror, in which approximately one quarter of the country's population was brutally murdered (Shawcross 2002), and (4) significantly contributed to economic growth in a number of neighboring states, such as Japan, Thailand and Singapore (Stubbs 1995: 8–9), and the British colony of Hong Kong (Stubbs 1999: 342). With the exception of Japan and Singapore, all East Asian miracle economies are post-proxy-war developments.

Table 5.1   Human Security in East Asia

	2011	**2012**
State	HDI*	PR/CL**
South Korea	0.897	1/2
North Korea	------	7/7
PRC	0.687	7/6
Taiwan	0.868	1/2
Vietnam	0.593	7/5
Cambodia	0.523	6/5
Japan	0.901	1/2
Singapore	0.866	4/4
Hong Kong	0.898	5/2

Source: Human Development Report 2011, http://hdr.undp.org/en/data/profiles/

HDI Taiwan: Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Taiwan; Freedom in the World 2012, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2012

* Human Development Index ** Political Rights/Civil Liberties

Since the end of World War II, several different patterns of post-conflict development have emerged in East Asia. In this chapter, the definition of development goes well beyond the classical economic-growth oriented approach. It is understood as a process of implementing policies that reflect the principles of human security as outlined in the seminal *1994 UNDP Development Report: New Dimensions for Human Security*. As such, post-conflict development focusses on the well-being, safety, and dignity of individual human beings (Oberleitner 2005: 190) and comprises two dimensions: (1) the freedom from want, the socio-economic dimension, and (2) the freedom from fear, the political dimension.

It, thus, encompasses all spheres of entitlement rights outlined in Chapter 2 of this book, including those dealing with political rights and civil liberties. Successful post-conflict development should thus significantly contribute to the well-being of all segments of society than merely generating economic growth. It should allow a growing portion of the population to enjoy "a better-off, more equitable, stable, secure, and fulfilling life" (Howe: Chapter 2).

In the following, the level of success of East Asian post-conflict developments is analyzed by combining the result of two different annual surveys: (1) the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI), which combines indicators of health, educational attainment and income and (2) the Freedom in World Survey measuring political rights and civil liberties. Using the combined results, different human security regimes may be identified (Table 5.1). Japan, South Korea and Taiwan differ significantly from the other regimes and may be labeled high-level human security regimes. That is, they have comparatively high levels of human development and political freedoms. Cambodia and North Korea seem to be the least developed, whereas Singapore, Hong Kong and China are somewhere in-between. The different patterns of post-conflict developments observed in East and Southeast Asia raise a series of questions as to what factors have shaped and eventually brought about their existence.

In the following sections of this chapter, the focus is on (1) identifying the most crucial factors behind Taiwan's success story, (2) analyzing its differences and commonalities with other East Asian post-conflict developments, and (3) looking at the changing global socio-political conditions and possible future scenarios of human security in Taiwan and the region as a whole.

Taiwan's Post-Conflict Development

Taiwan's success story is the outcome of two periods of post-conflict development. The first era began with China's cession of Taiwan to Japan in 1895 as a consequence of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which brought an end to the First Sino-Japanese War. Victory in the war increased Japan's confidence in its imperial ambitions in East Asia, and Taiwan was expected to play an important role in their fulfillment by serving as (1) a base for the empire's expansion into South China and Southeast Asia, (2) a stable supplier of agricultural products, and (3) a market for Japanese consumer and industrial products (Paine 2002: 4; Phillips 2003: 19–20).

As to achieve those objectives, the Japanese Diet allocated considerable economic aid to enhance Taiwan's administrative capacity, infrastructure and economy as well as health and educational system. After a decade of investment, Japan began to profit from the island's economic output, and the administration in Taiwan could rely on it to finance further development projects on the island (Beasley 1987: 150; Takekoshi 1907: 134). On average between 78 and 85 per cent of the island's exports, mainly raw materials and agricultural products such as sugar, camphor, tea, coal and fruit, went to Japan (Beasley 1987: 148;

Phillips 2003: 19). The Japanese also profited from the imposed monopolies on
tobacco, salt, opium and camphor (Takekoshi 1907) and its control on agricultural
production through various *zaibatsu*, large Japanese conglomerates of corporations,
which worked together with the administration in Taiwan (Phillips 2003: 20).
Japan's expansion policies and the resulting increase in military confrontations in
East Asia demanded higher industrial production output. Taiwan thus experienced
rapid industrialization throughout the 1930s and early 1940s, which led to a
drastic increase in the number of people engaged in the island's manufacturing
industry (Lai 1991:39). Moreover, Taiwan's workforce composition as a whole
changed considerably. The percentage of people engaged in agriculture dropped
from 70 per cent in 1905 to about 59 per cent in 1940. The industrial workforce
increased from 7 per cent to 13 per cent during the same time, and the
share of those employed in the service sector rose from 23 per cent to 27 per cent
(Phillips 2003: 21).

The Japanese considered economic development as one of the most important
pillars of colonial rule and thus encouraged entrepreneurship, emphasizing
education, especially primary and vocational education to increase productivity.
Primary school enrollment of the Taiwanese population increased steadily from 21
per cent of males and 4 per cent of females in 1917 to 81 per cent and 61 per cent
respectively in 1943 (Phillips 2003: 21). Higher education was, however, mostly
restricted to Japanese citizens and it was not before the early 1920s that a growing
number of Taiwanese were allowed to enroll in commercial and agricultural
colleges as well as the island's first universities and medical schools (Beasley
1987: 147). Although the Japanese Empire prioritized its own economic interests
and Japanese nationals held key positions in Taiwan's industry and commerce,
the number of Taiwanese entrepreneurs increased rapidly and brought wealth to
the island. In the early 1940s, the majority of companies in Taiwan were small or
medium-sized enterprises owned and staffed by Taiwanese (Chen 1988: 42).

Despite the socio-economic advancements, the Taiwanese had to endure harsh
cultural and political policies under the Japanese. Native languages were banned
and businesses were required to hire only applicants proficient in Japanese. Death
sentences were carried out for minor offences. Starting in the early 1920s, the
Japanese government enforced assimilation policies that required the Taiwanese
to be educated to understand their role and responsibilities as Japanese subjects.
As a consequence, the Taiwanese were given more political and social rights.
In 1945, the developmental state bureaucracy under the governor-general, the
highest representative of Imperial Japan in Taiwan, had around 85,000 people
on its staff, 56 per cent of whom and 35 per cent of the highest administrative
ranks where Taiwanese (Lai 1991: 42). Besides the Taiwanese presence in the
state bureaucracy, Taiwanese held positions in councils at all administrative levels.
By the end of World War II, three out of four council members were Taiwanese
(Lai 1991: 43).

To conclude, Japanese colonialism in Taiwan not only benefitted Imperial
Japan, it also (1) improved the economic and social conditions of the Taiwanese,

(2) significantly changed the social structure of Taiwanese society, (3) brought about an efficient state bureaucracy, and (4) laid the foundation for Taiwan's postwar economic success story. Japan's colonial development model was state-centric. That is, its main objectives were to generate economic growth and ensure national security. The second era of Taiwan's post-conflict development—the Republican Chinese era—began with the end of World War II and comprises three different stages: classical state-centric (1945–2000), modern human-centered (2000–2008), and neo state-centric (2008–present).

Classical State-Centric Development (1945–2000)

At the end of World War II, the United States, as the principal occupying power of Japanese territory, authorized Chinese President Chiang Kai-shek to administer Taiwan. On 25 October 1945, the first troops of the Republic of China arrived in Taiwan and the instrument of surrender was handed over to officials of the Kuomintang government. Japan lost sovereignty over Taiwan in April 1952 as a consequence of the *Treaty of Peace with Japan* (also known as the *San Francisco Peace Treaty*).

During much of the Cold War era, Taiwan's post-conflict development was shaped by (1) the US policy of containing Asian communism, (2) the Kuomintang's fear of extinction, and (3) the Kuomintang's quest for legitimacy at home and abroad. Despite the fact that the KMT government had an official mandate to put an end to Japanese occupation and to administer Taiwan, the population considered the KMT officials as representatives of a foreign regime that came to loot the island (Peng 1994). Animosities between the population and representatives of the regime increased rapidly and culminated into the 28 February Incident of 1947 and the subsequent massacre, in which KMT troops killed thousands of civilians (Lee, Yang and Chang 2006). The lost civil war in China and Chiang Kai-shek's decision to retreat to Taiwan in 1949 intensified the KMT's fear of extinction. Moreover, Mao Tse-tung's proclamation of the People's Republic of China as the de-facto and de-jure successor state of the Kuomintang's Republic of China put the KMT's claim to have sovereignty over Taiwan and to represent China at the United Nations and other international bodies into question. Consequently, the KMT faced a serious crisis of legitimacy. To avoid complete loss of legitimacy and ultimate extinction, the KMT had to map out plans of how to guarantee socio-economic development and political stability in Taiwan and how to defend itself against the PRC and its allies on the international stage. The regime depended on US assistance in formulating and carrying out such plans, which first seemed unlikely to materialize, since the US State Department blamed the military, civil, and economic incompetence of the KMT government for the defeat in China and its subsequent loss of sovereignty over it. In January 1950, President Truman thus announced that the United States would "not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Taiwan" (Hsu 1978: 25).

1   US policy regarding Taiwan changed with the outbreak of the Korean War
2 in June of the same year, and President Truman subsequently decided to order
3 the Seventh Fleet to prevent any communist attack on Taiwan on the grounds
4 that communist occupation of the island would pose a major threat to US
5 forces in the Pacific area (Hsu 1978: 27). Under the new ROC-US framework,
6 the US government offered substantial economic and military aid and advice
7 to Taiwan. Between 1950 and the mid-1960s, economic aid to Taiwan totaled
8 USD 1.5 billion. The funds were earmarked for infrastructural projects,
9 to finance the island's land reform, and to implement import-substitution
10 industrialization. In the mid-1960s, Taiwan's economy became self-sustaining
11 and US economic aid was suspended (Ho 1978: 110–117). The KMT's military
12 expenditures were substantial and without US assistance Taiwan's defense against
13 communist attack was infeasible (Jacoby 1966). The ROC-US framework led
14 to sustained rapid economic growth rates and egalitarian income distributions
15 (Fei, Ranis and Kuo 1979), which in turn provided the KMT with legitimacy to
16 govern Taiwan and to represent its population.
17   On the international stage, the United States assisted Chiang Kai-shek in
18 maintaining that the Kuomintang government was the sole legitimate government
19 of China and successfully defended its UN Security Council seat until 1971
20 (Luard 1971). The US remained the only major power to recognize the KMT
21 government until the end of 1978, when political realities finally forced the US
22 government to switch diplomatic recognition to Beijing. Contrary to expectations,
23 US influence on human security development in Taiwan intensified after the
24 diplomatic de-recognition as a consequence of the Taiwan Relation Act (TRA).
25 The TRA was passed by Congress shortly after the diplomatic recognition of
26 Beijing and restored relations between Washington and Taipei. With the TRA, the
27 US Congress directly intervened in Taiwan's democratic development. Congress
28 expected the KMT government to promote political reforms in Taiwan. This was
29 particularly true of human rights. Taiwan was under close observation by the US
30 Congress, the State Department and other agencies of the US government. John
31 F. Copper (1992: 123) notes that "few countries in the world have been under
32 scrutiny to such an extent regarding human rights problems. The human rights
33 provision in the TRA is the explanation for this scrutiny." It should be noted that
34 it was mainly the US Congress that openly and frequently criticized the KMT
35 regime for not doing enough to bring about democracy in Taiwan. The State
36 Department issued hardly any substantive comments on, or condemnations of,
37 Taiwan's political development (Lin 1991: 135).
38   Apart from the USA, the PRC has been equally important in Taiwan's postwar
39 development. For more than two decades of the Cold-War era, the KMT regime
40 received US backing because of its anti-PRC position and its permanent seat in
41 the UN Security Council. With the rise of China and the global acceptance of its
42 representation at the UN by the Beijing government, the PRC became a crucial
43 factor in Taiwan's economic and political development. Beijing indirectly put
44 pressure on the KMT regime to liberalize Taiwan's political system by initiating

several political reforms in China, which appeared to threaten Taiwan's image as the "freer" part of the two Chinas. Those reforms included the promulgation of a new and ostensibly more liberal constitution in 1982; the first and second rounds of direct elections of public officials at county-level in 1979–81 and 1984, respectively; the progressive liberalization of the media; and, in 1986, Deng Xiaoping's licensing of discussion on political reforms (Nathan and Ho 1993: 38). Moreover, Deng was praised by the international media as the man leading China into an era of freedom and prosperity. In 1981, Chiang Ching-kuo himself stated that now at the time when the "communist bandit regime is near the end of its road" it was even more important for his government "to strengthen the construction of constitutional government to demonstrate clearly the strong contrast between the two sides" (Nathan and Ho 1993: 38). In addition, without political reforms in Taiwan there probably would have been civil unrest sooner or later, and this in turn would have justified intervention by PRC forces.

Domestically, the ROC-US framework and the KMT government's economic, social, and educational policies brought about several societal changes, such as rising labor problems, urbanization, environmental degradation and a growing, politically more demanding middle class. In the 1970s, these changes gradually put an end to elite politics and marked the beginning of popular politics. The growing international isolation of the KMT regime further contributed to this new political phenomenon and transferred Taiwan's political system into a "soft authoritarianism" (Winckler 1984: 481). The scope of state-controlled elections was extended even at the national level to meet the demands of the changing domestic and international realities. Political opponents seized the opportunity and benefited from the government's perceived inability to deal with the various societal and global political changes. The time appeared to be ripe to address social issues and mingle them with political ones (Ai 1997). This strategy worked out and gave the opposition unprecedented electoral success and confidence to challenge the KMT's ban on political parties (Schafferer 2006: 35). The growing demand for mass participation in politics, international pressure and a series of dramatic global political changes, such as the downfall of authoritarian regimes in the neighboring Philippines and other countries around the world, contributed to President Chiang Ching-kuo's decision to implement far-reaching political reforms in the late 1980s. Consequently, martial law was lifted in 1987 and the formation of political parties legalized soon afterwards.

Lee Teng-hui, a native of Taiwan, succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo after his death in 1988. Lee had had a close relationship with the former dictator, whom he considered his political mentor. In his later writings, he notes that his succession was an accident caused by historical circumstances rather than being the result of Chiang's personal wishes (Lee 2004). Lee's assessment was based on the fact that he was neither a mainlander nor a staunch supporter of Han nationalism. Senior party leaders aware of his support for Taiwanese nationalism repeatedly attempted to oust him from the party leadership and the presidency (Lin 2004; Zhou 1993). Lee's political stance and his ability to present himself as a statesman

1 who would listen to the people helped him to win public support beyond party
2 lines and consolidate his power within party circles. Under his presidency (1988–
3 2000), major political reforms were carried out, turning Taiwan into a full-fledged
4 democracy (Chao, Dickson and Chao 2002). Another important achievement was
5 the successful establishment of a compulsory universal medical insurance system,
6 which went into operation in 1995 (Kwon 2005).

7   As to international affairs, Lee challenged the traditional KMT's modus
8 operandi in dealing with foreign governments. He pursued a proactive foreign
9 policy that should make the world aware of Taiwan's achievements, aspirations
10 and unfulfilled ambitions. The ultimate goal of Lee's foreign policy was to gain
11 Taiwan's international legitimization. Other goals included safeguarding Taiwan's
12 national security as well as improving the economic and social well-being of the
13 Taiwanese (Chen 2002). To achieve his goals, Lee thought it was necessary to
14 break with KMT traditions by giving up claims to represent China in international
15 affairs. He defined his government as the government of the Republic of China on
16 Taiwan and spoke of a "special state-to-state" relationship to describe Taiwan's
17 relations with China. Taiwan's outstanding economic and political achievements
18 gave Lee enough confidence in demanding international recognition and
19 participation in international organizations, such as the United Nations. The KMT
20 government, thus, for the first time requested its diplomatic allies to ask the UN
21 General Assembly to consider a membership application of the Republic of China
22 on Taiwan. In dealing with other governments, members of the ROC diplomatic
23 corps applied the concept of pragmatic diplomacy and refrained from putting
24 emphasis on the previous official position that the ROC government is the sole
25 legitimate government of China (Huang 2003). A further important foreign policy
26 pursued by the KMT government under Lee was the so-called *nanxiang zhengce*,
27 which aimed at diverting part of Taiwan's trade and investment flows from the
28 PRC to Southeast Asia and South America to decrease economic dependence on
29 the Beijing regime (Chan 1996).

30   Political marketing played an important role in this new modified version
31 of pragmatic diplomacy. The KTM government increasingly used mass media
32 advertising and hired professionals to convey its messages of a democratic Taiwan
33 striving for recognition and opportunities to share its experience and capabilities
34 with the international community. The highlight of the costly advertising campaigns
35 was Lee's widely publicized visit to his alma mater at Cornell University in
36 1995. His speech on Taiwan's achievements and role in the word was aired live
37 on several TV networks, including CNN. The campaign proved a success as it
38 helped Taiwan to reach a large audience not only back home but also abroad.
39 The PRC, on the other hand, was not amused about Lee's new pragmatic policy.
40 The decision to allow President Lee to enter US territory reversed more than 25
41 years of US diplomatic precedent and contradicted US government public policy
42 statements and private reassurances to the PRC that such a visit would violate US
43 policies. As a consequence, the PRC accused the US government of encouraging
44 "the authorities in Taiwan" to move away from its "one-China" policy and

tried to intimidate voters by carrying out missile tests in the waters surrounding Taiwan prior to Taiwan's first direct presidential election of March 1996. The US government responded by sending two aircraft carrier battle groups to the vicinity of Taiwan to symbolize US support for the island-state. The crisis caused the US to rethink its security policies and called for closer defense ties with Taipei (Hickey 1998; Lieberthal 1995; Ross 2000).

To conclude, Taiwan under Lee Teng-hui further developed into one of the region's most democratic states. In foreign relations, Lee was quite successful in breaking Taiwan's political isolation and by doing so challenging the traditional ROC-US security framework. Taiwan under Lee made the first attempt to leave the state-centric environment of development: Lee was an outspoken critic of the "Asian value" theory (Barr 2000) and sought for a more active role of Taiwan in the international community (Teng-hui 1999).

Human-Centered Development (2000–2008)

In 2000, Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Taiwan's largest opposition party, won the presidential election. The international community appraised Chen Shui-bian's victory as a major step forward in Taiwan's process of democratization (Rigger 2001). Chen's presidency was doomed to be overshadowed by political crises, conflicts and prolonged political stalemate right from the first day in office mainly because of reasons caused by historical legacies: (1) The DPP lacked a majority in parliament and the president is more of a figurehead than the chief executive of government. President Chen thus needed the goodwill of the opposition to pass legislation. (2) Chen envisaged major reforms in areas sensitive to the KMT, such as national identity, foreign relations, constitution, human rights, and transitional justice. (3) Chen's political ideology contradicted the traditional state-centric development concepts promoted by the previous KMT government (Schafferer 2010). The first serious confrontations occurred within the first year in office (Rigger 2002) and continued to prevent the DPP government from implementing most of its key policies.

The most controversial policies dealt with transitional justice, human rights and national identity. Chen Shui-bian—himself a victim of KMT repression—emphasized the need for a process of coming to terms with the past and the atrocities committed during the martial law era. Apart from authorizing research on the responsibility of the KMT government in the 2–28 Incident and crimes against humanity, the DPP carried out symbolic initiatives, such as the renaming of public spaces and the removal of statues of the two former dictators, Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo. President Chen publicized his intention of turning Taiwan into Asia's most democratic state while at the same time sharing responsibility in the global attempt to protect and promote human rights internationally. The DPP government subsequently called for (1) the establishment of an independent national human rights commission based on the Paris Principles, (2) the abolition of the death penalty, (3) the ratification of

two international human rights covenants (UN convents on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) and their codification into national legislation (Schafferer 2010).

As to the controversial issue of national identity, Taiwan under Chen was determined to bring the island state's national and cultural identity more in line with recent demographic realities. In the past, KMT governments predominantly promoted Han nationalism with the aim of "recovering" Chinese territory. President Chen, on the other hand, questioned the necessity of having Taiwan suffer because of the KMT's historical legacies. In his inaugural speech in May 2004, Chen put emphasis on the fact that Taiwan had over the last few centuries become the home of migrants with different cultural backgrounds and that Taiwan thus had a multi-ethnic society. Chen had a vision of a cosmopolitan island-state that is prepared to work toward establishing the values of shared prosperity and respect for the rule of law. The changing concept of Taiwan's national identity was also reflected in Chen's foreign policy: (1) Taiwan vigorously strived for a more active role in the international community by joining international organizations. During Chen's term in office, Taiwan had expanded its membership in international governmental organizations from 16 to 26 (Larus 2006: 32). (2) For the first time, the government in Taipei requested its diplomatic allies to ask the UN General Assembly to consider membership application of Taiwan by putting greater emphasis on the island of Taiwan than on the legally-flawed existence of Republican China (Larus 2006: 34). (3) Taiwan launched its own international organization, the Democratic Pacific Union, in August 2005 with the aim of consolidating democratic values, fostering human development and safeguarding regional security. The organization aimed to increase the number of states in the region that share Taiwan's appreciation of democratic development, peace and security. Taiwan wanted to become the region's "exporter of democracy" (Larus 2006: 43).

Domestically, leaders of the KMT and its splinter parties increasingly felt threatened by Chen's de-Sinofication and transitional justice policies and considered his presidency a dictatorship (Huang 2004; Schafferer 2010). Allegations of widespread corruption led to large-scale anti-Chen demonstrations in 2006, which seriously undermined future chances of the DPP to govern Taiwan. Internationally, Chen Shui-bian's domestic and foreign policies were considered a threat to regional security (Copper 2006). Taiwan was thus politically more isolated than it had been under any other previous government.

Neo State-Centric (China-Centered) Development

In 2008, Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT won a landslide victory in the presidential election, which was appraised by the international community as a major step towards peace and security in East Asia (Gold 2009). The KMT had run its electoral campaign primarily on the issue of economic cooperation with the PRC and predicted that a rapprochement with the Beijing government would

(1) maintain peace and security in East Asia, (2) increase Taiwan's international space, (3) allow Taiwan meaningful representation in international bodies, (4) permit Taiwan to sign FTAs with other economies, and (5) accelerate Taiwan's economic growth (Muyard 2010). It is too early to determine whether all the envisaged goals will became reality, but there are several observable trends that are likely to have an impact on human security development in Taiwan and the region as a whole. Domestically, the return of the KMT has brought about (1) a revival of Chinese nationalism putting an end to former President Chen's cosmopolitan state (Muyard 2010: 7–8), (2) the end of transitional justice (Schafferer 2013), and (3) the return of Taiwan to the state-centric environment with its emphasis on economic growth (Chung 2009). Moreover, the KMT's rapprochement with China is not a forced upon process, it is rather driven by nationalist nostalgia and strategic interests. China's rise to a world power has changed the KMT's perception of its commitment to the US. A de-alignment with the US and closer cooperation with Beijing appears to open more doors to the KMT than staying in a relationship with the US. The current rapprochement could thus be interpreted as part of a Finlandization of Taiwan rather than the first step towards unification with the PRC (Gilley 2010), which as a consequence is bound to further minimize Western influence on East Asia and contribute to a consolidation of the state-centric environment in the region.

Taiwan's Post-Conflict Development: A Comparative View

In the following, the commonalities as well as differences of Taiwan's post-conflict development and those of other East Asian states are analyzed. All of the East Asian post-conflict success stories have something in common: they transformed, at some stage in its development cycle, into an export-oriented economy as a result of the US containment policy and the two devastating wars that came with it. The seeds of economic growth in East Asian miracle economies came with the Cold War (1) in the form of US economic and military aid, (2) as a result of its growing demand for commodities produced in the region, and (3) special procurement income from orders placed by the US military (Stubbs 1999). US economic and military aid was a crucial factor in Taiwan's and South Korea's economic development and their ability to defend themselves against communist attacks (Ho 1978; Whang 1987). The Korean War benefitted Japan and Singapore, and forced Hong Kong into export-oriented manufacturing, after a trade embargo on China had been imposed and Hong Kong had lost its traditional entrepôt role. The Vietnam War significantly increased economic growth and expedited export-industrialization in Japan, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea (Stubbs 1999: 345–348).

The effect of war is one of the most important similarities of East Asian developments. A further interesting fact is that Taiwan as well as Japan and South Korea have exceptionally high levels of human security development (Table 5.1),

which significantly differentiates them from the other post-conflict developments in the region. A closer look at the historical development of the three economies may reveal the reasons behind their unprecedented success among East Asian states. Japan and its two former colonies have all followed the same pattern of growth and influence: (1) comprehensive agrarian reform that changed the land ownership structure and increased productivity, (2) import substitution and (3) export-oriented industrialization, (4) two-stage development interrupted by war, (5) subject to US influence and assistance. There may be other East Asian developments with similar patterns, but the scope of each transformation process and extent of US influence is rather unique—especially the crucial two-stage development. As mentioned in the previous section of this chapter, Taiwan has undergone two related post-conflict developments: (1) the Japanese colonial period and (2) the Republican Chinese era. Socio-economic development under the Japanese was instrumental in bringing about Taiwan's postwar economic miracle (Grabowski 1988). The roots of South Korea's post-conflict development are in its colonial era rather than in the aftermath of the Korean War. Kohli concludes that "Japanese colonial influence on Korea, in 1905–45, was decisive in shaping a political economy that later evolved into high-growth South-Korean path to development" (Kohli 1994: 1270). Japan itself experienced two separate stages of development: (1) the prewar era beginning in the late nineteenth century, and (2) the postwar years. Following the Meiji restoration, Japan had a successful record of deliberate, state-led political and economic transformation. At the core of the new political economy was the developmental state—an "effective centralized state capable of both controlling and transforming Japanese society" (Kohli 1994: 1272). In spite of being state-centric in nature, developmental states—unlike conventional states that are exclusively "concerned with establishing the rules of the economic game"—seek to formulate and pursue "substantive social and economic goals" (Beeson 2009: 9). Japan installed a developmental state system in Taiwan and South Korea, replacing the old "predatory" state concepts that inhibited development.

As mentioned in the previous section of this chapter, Taiwan's post-conflict development was driven by the KMT's fear of extinction and performance legitimacy. The Cold War, the permanent threat of North Korean invasion, and US dependence put South Korea in a very similar position (Cotton 1989), whereas Japan's fear of extinction has its origin in the nineteenth century, when it was forced to accept limits on its sovereignty as a consequence of Western imperialism. The question of how to avoid China's fate led to civil war and the Meiji Restoration of 1868. The Sino-Japanese War (1894–95) and the subsequent Japanese imperialism were the result of Japan's search for security in a hostile world, which put enormous pressure on its government to deliver, since the war and Japan's imperial expansion policies were paid by the people who had subscribed generously to war bond issues expecting a better life under the flag of the rising star (Barnhart 1995: 5–19). To conclude, national sovereignty, fears of extinction and performance legitimacy have been driving forces in post-conflict developments in the East Asian states of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea.

Prospects of Human Security in Taiwan

As mentioned in the previous sections of this chapter, Taiwan's development has predominantly been the result of extraordinary political and historical circumstances. The current and future direction of its development depends on how Taiwan adapts to the changes in the constellation of those circumstances. In this respect, Taiwan's state capacity in foreign relations plays a crucial role. Using Caporaso's (1978) terminology, Taiwan is short of structural power. That is, its ability to determine the rules of interstate exchanges is rather limited. It is a weak state and as such it is forced to rely on its bargaining power to survive. Historically, the strength of the Taiwanese state in foreign relations has derived "from its ability to manipulate and adjust to those "incidental" aspects of interstate interactions that are to some extent susceptible to its influence" (Chan 1988: 47). The end of the Cold War, the emergence of the third wave of democratization (Huntington 1991) and the subsequent proclamation of liberal democracy as the prevailed form of political governance (Fukuyama 1989: 3; Fukuyama 1995: 29) changed the environmental setting of Taiwan's success story.

Taiwan under Lee Teng-hui attempted to increase its state capacity in foreign relations by using its economic and political achievements as a bargaining chip. Domestically, the global democratic atmosphere helped Lee (or convinced him) to accelerate democratic reforms and by doing so consolidate his political standing. On the international stage, he sided with the victorious West and became an outspoken critic of the "Asian values" paradigm, while trying to enlarge Taiwan's international space and to contain China's growing ambitions. His successor, Chen Shui-bian, followed his footsteps and even more tried to "sell" Taiwan's outstanding democratic achievements as to extend its international space (Rawnsley 2003), but he proved to be less successful. His attempt to transform Taiwan into a cosmopolitan state that is prepared to work toward the fulfillment of the global democratic project was neither at home nor abroad appreciated for various internal and external reasons. Previous sections of the chapter have addressed the most important internal factors of Chen's failure. As to the external ones, a series of global events and developments have put an end to the immediate post–Cold War democratic euphoria and shifted the world focus away from the global democratic project to state-centric interests, such as national security and economic growth (Diamond 2008).

Globally, the US-led War on Terror and its security policies have (1) challenged Western concepts and practice of human rights and democracy (Cole 2003; Lobel 2001), (2) endangered international human rights norms and institutions (Fitzpatrick 2003), (3) raised concerns about the ability of individual states to promote and protect human rights in a globalized world (Evans 2005), and (4) have either helped to consolidate non-democratic regimes in less developed states or deepened anti-US sentiments there (Whitaker 2007). Apart from the overtly negative impact of the war, there have been indigenous developments in post–Cold War Asia that have not only changed the Asian perception of liberal democracy in particular and

the West in general, but have also led to alterations in the foreign policies of North American and European states with regard to the promotion of human rights. The most important development in this context certainly is the rebirth of Asia— the economic reintegration of Asian states and the re-emergence of China as a powerful player (Feigenbaum 2011). Over the last two decades, China has risen to a crucial economic, military and political power. Domestically, the country has had an impressive socio-economic development. On the international stage, China has adopted a more proactive foreign policy than during the Cold War, expanding its spheres of influence not only in Asia, but also to other parts of the world (Cheng and Shi 2009; Medeiros and Fravel 2003). The rebirth of Asia has brought about several changes that may significantly affect human security development in the region:

1. The US has become a relatively less influential player in Asia.

2. The new environment has challenged the traditional Cold War security arrangements, such as those between Washington and Seoul, and Taipei, respectively.

3. Economic growth in East Asia, the rise of China to a global power and the deepening fiscal crises in the US and Europe have changed the East Asian perception of the West and East: The advanced democracies of the West "are steadily losing their attractiveness" among liberal-minded intellectual elites in China (Chu 2012: 53) and most likely in other Asian states as well. Finally, Asians may conclude that indigenous concepts of development are superior to Western notions thereof, which as a consequence would confirm the "Asian values" theorem of the 1990s.

4. East Asians have gained more confidence in their ability to solve problems without the help of the West. This new self-confidence and the end of the Cold War struggle between the US and the USSR have caused the re-emergence of nationalism in Asia. As a consequence, there has been a resurgence of classical patterns of conflict. States in the region increasingly act to defend their own interests rather than those of foreign regimes. The era of proxy warfare is over, and territorial disputes between states in the region are on the rise.

5. The global economic dependence on China has forced Western government to adapt their foreign human rights polices to Chinese standards, even to the extent of openly criticizing democratic initiatives of Asian governments that seem to endanger Chinese interests.

The future of East Asian human security development will be most likely be determined by China rather than by decision-makers in the "Old World."

Conclusion

Taiwan has become one of the most developed states in East Asia in terms of human security. In this chapter the most important factors behind the success story have been identified and include its geopolitical importance during the Cold War, US aid, Japanese colonization and the global wave of democratization that toppled regimes at the end of the last century. Moreover, there are several interesting commonalities between Taiwan and other successful East Asian states, such as economic growth as a result of proxy warfare in Asia during the Cold War. Among all the many success stories in the region, there are, however, only two—South Korea and Japan—that have experienced almost identical developmental processes and that have been exposed to the same sources of influence.

China's role in the region's post-conflict developments has already gained momentum whereas the US has become a comparatively less influential power in the region. As to Taiwan, the role of China in its development has changed slowly but significantly over the last two decades. During the closing decades of the last century, the PRC's permanent military threat and its propagandized political reforms constituted convincing arguments for the KMT regime to accelerate the reform process in Taiwan. China's rise as an economic, political and military power, and the global economic dependence on the goodwill of its authoritarian regime have led to a shift in paradigm. There have been fewer incentives for Taiwan to consolidate its democratic achievement in a world that in the aftermath of 9–11 and the global financial crisis has traded the global democratic project in exchange for national security and economic growth. This shift in paradigm also affected Taiwan's attempt under the DPP government to leave the state-centric environment that had dominated the island-state for more than half a century. As explained in the previous section of this chapter, former President Chen Shui-bian's national project was to turn Taiwan into a cosmopolitan state, advocating Western concepts of universalism, solidarism, collective security and external intervention in domestic affairs. With the return of the KMT to power in 2008, Chen's national project was terminated and Taiwan returned to the state-centric environment, with the KMT defining "state" as China. President Ma Ying-yeou's rapprochement with the Beijing government and the subsequent signing of an economic cooperation agreement turned a seemingly permanent military threat into a promising partnership. This new approach has put into question the traditional US-ROC cooperation framework and the necessity to depend on the West, in general, and on the decision makers in Washington, in particular, to ensure future economic development and national security. The future of human security in East Asia seemingly depends on the fortunes of China's striving for security and power in a post-US era.

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